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For most of us in the UK the last few months 
have been dominated by Government and 
media reports about the Swine Flu pandemic. 
Many people will have thought over the 
consequences of a mass outbreak, particularly 
those of us with young children or elderly 
relatives. Not that long ago the subject of 
hospital-based infections such as Clostridium 
diffi  cile and MRSA was the focus of huge 
amounts of attention from the newspapers 
and television.
At fi rst sight infection outbreaks might 
be thought of purely as a medical or 
microbiological matter and not a subject to 
interest ergonomists. In reality quite a lot of 
recent work, particularly within the domain 
of systems ergonomics, has sought to explain 
the underlying factors leading up to infection 
outbreaks. Th e aim of this short article is to 
describe some work focusing on a specifi c 
hospital-based infection outbreak which 
occurred at the Maidstone and Tunbridge 
Wells NHS Trust between 2005 and 2007. 
A second aim is to demonstrate the value 
of using a systems ergonomics approach in 
order to analyse infection outbreaks and help 
prevent their occurrence.
Th e outbreaks which occurred within the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust 
represent the combined impact of a complex 
set of factors extending over several years. In 
common with most examples of accidents, 
disasters or large-scale adverse events, the 
outbreaks are best interpreted as arising 
through the combination of a number of 
interrelated systemic factors and infl uences. 
At the very highest level of the system, 
Government-set targets placed many 
individuals, particularly those at Trust board 
and management levels under a great deal 
of pressure. Th is pressure in itself may have 
led them to make poor decisions, and in 
some cases to prioritise bed occupancy rates 
at the expense of the risk of an infection 
outbreak.  Within the Trust it is likely that 
targets exerted considerable pressure on the 
system as a whole and this pressure fi ltered 
down various levels of the system. It is 
possible that the drive to comply with these 
targets increased the likelihood of an adverse 
event taking place at some stage. Poor 
communication, confusion of responsibilities 
and accountabilities between and within the 
various regulatory bodies delayed the time in 
which they could react to the outbreaks. A 
2008 report by the Healthcare Commission 
examined the underlying causes of serious 
failures in NHS healthcare providers and 
identifi ed large-scale organisational processes 
such as mergers and poor change management 
procedures as common factors.
Within the hospital the actions of senior 
managers were identifi ed as signifi cantly 
contributing to the failure to prevent and 
deal with the outbreaks. Th e link between 
management, human resource management 
(HRM) practices and work performance 
outcomes has been investigated in detail in 
the last few years. Evidence-based reviews 
suggest that there is a link between high-
involvement HRM practices and employee 
productivity. High involvement HRM 
practices typically include empowering 
employees to make their own decisions and 
the presence of self-managed teams. Th ese 
types of practices in organisations have also 
been shown to increase levels of employee 
productivity. Similar eff ects have been shown 
between HRM practices and measurements 
of safety outcomes (e.g. number of adverse 
events).
Aside from the way in which senior 
managers behaved at the Trust, the question 
still remains as to why they ignored, or at 
least failed to realise, the seriousness of the 
outbreaks and their consequences. Many of 
the managers interviewed in the original 
Healthcare Commission report on the 
outbreaks reported that they were aware of 
how serious the situation had become within 
the Trust, but were powerless to do anything 
about it. One possible explanation is what 
Diane Vaughan in her highly infl uential study 
of the Challenger shuttle disaster termed 
the ‘normalisation of deviance’, namely that 
managers over time began to accept and take 
for granted the level of infection risk within 
the Trust. Only after the level of risk built up 
to a point where it could not be controlled, 
did they begin to realise the gravity of the 
situation.
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together played a part in the outbreaks. 
Staffi  ng ratios and levels of staff  morale 
almost certainly contributed to the problem 
of containing the spread of infection on the 
wards. In general, the research literature 
provides some evidence that lower levels of 
staffi  ng increase the likelihood of infections 
occurring. For example, researchers have 
found an inverse relationship between staff  
downsizing and the rate of hospital-based 
infection. Curiously, little research has been 
conducted on the impact of job satisfaction/
morale on hospital infection levels,. 
However, fi ndings from other domains 
(e.g. manufacturing and service industries) 
suggests that lower levels of satisfaction 
are clearly linked to lower levels of job 
performance.
Finally, it might be conjectured that the 
behaviour of clinicians and other health 
care professionals within the Trust shares 
similarities with those of senior managers 
and Trust board managers. Many individuals 
at ward level were aware of the poor hygiene 
and inadequate patient monitoring practices 
but saw no way to improve the situation. Karl 
Weick and Kathleen Sutcliff e analysed data 
from the Bristol Royal Infi rmary Report and 
concluded that hospital staff  became locked 
into particular lines of action or behaviour 
where they “search for confi rmation that they 
are doing what they should be doing” . Th ese 
so-called ‘cultures of entrapment’ inhibit an 
organisation’s ability to break out of patterns 
of behaviour that, over time, can lead to 
adverse outcomes.
Many of the issues that have been described in 
this article have not been researched in much 
depth within infection control, particularly 
organisational and managerial behaviour. 
Most research, alongside interventions 
designed to improve infection control and 
limit outbreaks, has focused on individual 
levels of analysis (e.g. hand hygiene). As a 
result we are currently in danger of only seeing 
one part a much larger picture. Adopting a 
systems approach is one step towards fi lling 
in the missing details, particularly as they 
relate to causal relationships that may exists 
between system levels such as the interaction 
between management styles, aspects of 
hospital design and individual behaviour (e.g. 
hand washing), and outcomes (e.g. infection 
rates). 
Preventing and minimising the risk of 
infection outbreaks is likely to be a huge 
challenge for the future. In order to meet 
this challenge ergonomists will need to 
work alongside healthcare professionals 
and managers, organisational psychologists 
and other groups e.g. hospital architects, 
microbiologists and infection control experts. 
Much remains to be done. However, adopting 
a systems perspective represents a promising 
way of mapping out areas worthy of further 
investigation, as well as scoping the nature of 
interventions designed to prevent the spread 
of infections. 
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